JOSEPH D. ELFORD (SBN 189934) 1 Law Offices of Joseph D. Elford 1875 Mission Street #311 2 San Francisco, CA 94103 3 Telephone: (415) 573-7842 Email: joeelford@yahoo.com 4 Counsel for Plaintiffs 5 ARASH ETEGHAEI and MITRA ZADE 6 7 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 FOR THE COUNY OF ALAMEDA 9 10 ARASH ETEGHAEI and MITRA ZADE, Civil Action No. 11 Plaintiff, **VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR**) 12 **DECLARATORY RELIEF,** PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, 13 PERMANENT INJUNCTION. AND DAMAGES COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, a municipal corporation; 14 ALAMEDA COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT,) 15 a municipal agency; SHERIFF GREGORY J. **JURY TRIAL DEMANDED** AHERN, in his individual and official capacities; 16 LT. FARRUGGIA, in his individual and official capacities; OFR. SCOTT BRANDON, in his 17 individual and official capacities; OFR. R. WALTER,) 18 in his individual and official capacities; DET. A. MATEEN, in his individual and official 19 capacities; OFR. J. DORMER, in his individual and 20 official capacities; OFR. M. MONCADA, in his individual and official capacities; OFR. JOSHUA 21 ARMILLO, in his individual and official capacities; UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. SANTA 22 BARBARA, an entity of unknown form; SGT. G. 23 LEVETTE, in his individual and official capacities; OFR. AVILA, in her individual and official capacities;) 24 OFR. SAMANIEGO, in her individual and official capacities; and DOES 1-50, 25 26 Defendants. 27

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. Both the federal and state constitutions forbid law enforcement officers from using excessive force in their execution of search warrants. Despite this, on November 2, 2021, the defendant officers formed a squad of at least ten officers to execute a warrant at the home of plaintiffs Arash Eteghaei and Mitra Zade (collectively "plaintiffs"), who are indisputably innocent of any criminal wrongdoing, with an extreme and excessive show of force. The officers came to plaintiffs' home with sirens blazing, guns drawn and loudspeaker commands to exit the home, even though they had already called Mr. Eteghaei to tell him this, which he did moments later. The officers knew that plaintiffs were innocent of any wrongdoing, as the warrant was being executed against their son, yet they pointed guns at plaintiffs' faces and handcuffed them, despite their cooperation. Worse still, the officers placed handcuffs on plaintiff Zade so tightly that she suffered visible injuries to her wrists. The apparent motivation for the officers to use this unwarranted show of force was to embarrass the plaintiffs in front on their neighbors and place them in unnecessary fear, which the Constitution forbids. While the Constitution allows law enforcement officers to execute search warrants in a reasonable manner, it does not allow them to employ warrants to embarrass, humiliate and make a spectacle of innocent residents and to scare them. It also does not permit officers to detain or arrest persons without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. This action is filed to contest defendants' gratuitous display (and use) of force and to prevent what happened to plaintiffs from happening to others.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2. Plaintiffs bring this action to redress the deprivation of constitutional rights secured to them, and others, by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (42

U.S.C. § 1983) and Article I, Section 7 of the California Constitution. It also seeks to redress the deprivation of plaintiffs statutory rights and common law torts under State law.

- 3. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Article VI, Section 10 of the California Constitution, Cal. Code of Civil Procedure § 88; Cal. Civil Code § 52.1; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343; and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988. This court has concurrent jurisdiction over the federal causes of action. (*Williams v. Horvath* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 837.)
- 4. This Court has personal jurisdiction over each of the defendants, as they operate or do business within the County of Alameda, which is within this judicial district. (See Code of Civil Procedure, § 88.)
- 5. On April 25, 2022, plaintiffs filed am administrative claim with the County of Alameda, in compliance with California Government Code Sections 910 *et seq*. That claim was rejected by the County as a matter of law on May 30, 2022, since the County failed to act upon it with 45 days. (Cal. Govt. Code, § 912.4, subd. (c).) This complaint is filed on June 17, 2022, so this action is timely.
- 6. On May 2, 2022, plaintiffs filed am administrative claim with the University of California, Santa Barbara ("UCSB") Risk Management and Insurance Office, in compliance with California Government Code Sections 910 *et seq*. That claim was rejected by UCSB as a matter of law on June 16, 2022, since UCSB failed to act upon it with 45 days. (Cal. Govt. Code, § 912.4, subd. (c).) This complaint is filed on June 17, 2022, so this action is timely.
- 7. Venue is proper in this judicial district because the events giving rise to the complaint occurred in the County of Alameda, which is in this judicial district. (See Code of Civil Procedure, §§ 392, 394 & 395).

III. THE PARTIES

A. Plaintiffs

- 8. Plaintiff ARASH ETEGHAEI ("Eteghaei") was a resident of the County of Alameda at all relevant times. He is a fifty-one-year-old father who is married to plaintiff Mitra Zade. Neither has any criminal history or has been accused of any criminal wrongdoing.
- 9. Plaintiff MITRA ZADE ("Zade") was a resident of the County of Alameda at all relevant times. She is a fifty-two-year-old mother who is married to plaintiff Eteghaei. Neither has any criminal history or has been accused of any criminal wrongdoing.

B. Defendants

- 10. Defendant COUNTY OF ALAMEDA ("Alameda" or "County") is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a municipal corporation within the State of California.
- 11. Defendant SHERIFF GREGORY J. AHERN is, and at all times mentioned herein was, the Sheriff of El Dorado County. He is sued in his individual and official capacities.
- 12. Defendant LT. FARRUGGIA ("Farruggia") is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a Deputy Sheriff with the County of Alameda. He is sued in his individual and official capacities.
- 13. Defendant OFR. SCOTT BRANDON ("Brandon") is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a Deputy Sheriff with the County of Alameda. He is sued in his individual and official capacities.
- 14. Defendant OFR. R. WALTER ("Walter") is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a Deputy Sheriff with the County of Alameda. He is sued in his individual and official capacities.

- 15. Defendant DET. A. MATEEN ("Mateen") is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a Deputy Sheriff with the County of Alameda. He is sued in his individual and official capacities.
- 16. Defendant OFR. J. DORMER ("Dormer") is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a Deputy Sheriff with the County of Alameda. He is sued in his individual and official capacities.
- 17. Defendant OFR. M. MONCADA ("Moncada") is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a Deputy Sheriff with the County of Alameda. He is sued in his individual and official capacities.
- 18. Defendant OFR. JOSHUA ARMILLO ("Armillo") is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a Deputy Sheriff with the County of Alameda. He is sued in his individual and official capacities.
- 19. Defendant UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA BARBARA ("UCSB") is, and at all times mentioned herein was, an entity of unknown form within the State of California.
- 20. Defendant SGT. G. LEVETTE ("Levette") is, and at all times mentioned herein was, an officer with the UCSB Police Department ("UCSBPD"). He is sued in his individual and official capacities.
- 21. Defendant OFR. AVILA is, and at all times mentioned herein was, an officer with the UCSB Police Department ("UCSBPD"). She is sued in his individual and official capacities.
- 22. Defendant OFR. SAMANIEGO ("Samaniego") is, and at all times mentioned herein was, an officer with the UCSB Police Department ("UCSBPD"). She is sued in her individual and official capacities.

- 23. Plaintiffs are ignorant of the true names of defendants sued herein as DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, and therefore sue said defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will amend this complaint to allege their true names and capacities when ascertained. Plaintiff is informed and believes and therefore alleges that each of the Doe defendants is legally responsible and liable for the injuries and damages hereinafter set forth, and that each of the said defendants proximately caused said injuries and damages by reason of their violation of constitutional and legal rights.
- 24. Each of the defendants caused and is responsible for the below-described unlawful conduct and resulting injuries by, among other things: personally participating in the unlawful conduct or acting jointly or conspiring with others who did so by authorizing, acquiescing or setting in motion policies, plans or actions that led to the unlawful conduct; by failing to take action to prevent the unlawful conduct; and by ratifying the unlawful conduct that occurred by agents and officers under their discretion and control, including failing to take remedial steps or disciplinary action. In doing the acts alleged herein, defendants and each of them had a duty to protect the health and safety of the Plaintiff, and they failed to exercise due care in the enforcement of that duty.
- 25. In doing the acts alleged herein, Defendants and each of them acted as the agent, servant, employee, partner, joint-venturer, co-conspirator and/or in concert with each of said other defendants; and in engaging in the conduct hereinafter alleged, were acting with the permission, knowledge, consent and ratification of their co-defendants, and each of them.
- 26. In engaging in the conduct described herein, Defendants acted under color of law and in the course and scope of their employment with the County. In engaging in the conduct described herein, Defendants exceeded the authority vested in them as police officers under the

United States and California Constitutions and as police officers employed by Defendant County.

- 27. The acts and omissions of Defendants as set forth herein were pursuant to the customs, policies, practices, and procedures of County of Alameda and its Sheriff's Department and/or the University of California, Santa Barbara and its Police Department.
- 28. Defendants' acts were willful, wanton, malicious and oppressive and done with conscious disregard and deliberate indifference to plaintiffs' rights, thereby justifying the award of exemplary and punitive damages.

IV. FACTS APPLICABLE TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION

- 29. Plaintiffs' son Arian has been accused of crimes while attending the University of California, Santa Barbara. In search of Arian's cellphone and to arrest him, defendants executed a warrant at the home of Arian's parents, plaintiffs Eteghaei and Zade, on November 2, 2021. Neither Eteghaei nor Zade has any criminal history or has been accused of any wrongdoing, and the defendants knew this when they executed the warrant.
- 30. Despite the fact that neither the plaintiffs nor Arian posed any risk to the officers, they assembled a team of at least ten officers to execute a search warrant for a cellphone at the home that plaintiffs had lived in for 16 years.
- 31. The officers came with a full show of force. They blared their sirens, issued commands over a loudspeaker, and arrived with guns drawn.
- 32. When Eteghaei exited his home in compliance with the defendants' commands in his bare feet, one officer pointed a gun in his face and other officers handcuffed him.
- 33. They did the same to Zade when she exited the house, after she requested that defendants produce a search warrant.

- 34. Furthermore, the defendants placed the handcuffs on Zade so tightly that she suffered visible injuries to her wrists.
- 35. Defendants' gratuitous and extreme use of force was unnecessary and was designed to embarrass and humiliate the plaintiffs in front of their neighbors.
- 36. Their seizures of the plaintiffs without reasonable suspicion or probable cause also violates the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 7 of the California Constitution.
- 37. An actual and substantial controversy exists between plaintiffs and defendants as to their respective legal rights and duties. Plaintiffs contend that the defendants' excessive use of force and improper seizures are unlawful and unconstitutional, and malicious and wanton, thereby warranting the imposition of punitive damages. Defendants contend the opposite.
- 38. If not enjoined by the Court, defendants will continue to commit similar constitutional violations, in derogation of the rights of plaintiffs and other similarly situated individuals. Such conduct, if left unchecked, will inflict irreparable injury on the plaintiffs and other persons.
 - 39. Plaintiffs have no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law.
 - 40. Plaintiffs have exhausted their administrative remedies. (See *supra* at p. 3, ¶¶ 5,

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V. CAUSES OF ACTION

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

Violation of Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment Rights (42 U.S.C. §§ 1983) --

Unreasonable Seizure

(Against All Defendants)

- 41. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 40 of this Complaint as though fully alleged herein.
- 42. Defendants' seizure of plaintiffs was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as described below.
- 43. The defendant officers unreasonably detained plaintiffs in their execution of the search warrant because they did so without reasonable suspicion that either plaintiff had committed a crime or posed a threat.
- 44. By pointing guns at the plaintiffs, handcuffing them, and forcing Mrs. Zade into a law enforcement vehicle, the defendants falsely arrested the plaintiffs without probable cause
- 45. As a direct and proximate result of defendants' illegal conduct, plaintiffs suffered actual injuries and damages.
- 46. The acts and omissions alleged in this Complaint are indicative and representative of a repeated course of conduct by defendant County of Alameda tantamount to a custom, policy or practice of condoning and tacitly encouraging the disregard for the constitutional rights of Alameda County citizens, as described herein. The County is, therefore, liable under *Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of the City of New York*, 429 U.S. 1071 (1977).

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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

Violation of Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment Rights (42 U.S.C. §§ 1983) --

Excessive Force in the Execution of the Search Warrant

- 47. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 46 of this Complaint as though fully alleged herein.
- 48. Defendants' execution of the search warrant at plaintiffs' residence involved an excessive and unreasonable show and use of force.
- 49. *First*, the defendant officers exhibited unreasonable and excessive show of force by employing multiple vehicles with sirens, using loudspeaker commands, pointing guns at the defendants, and handcuffing them in front of their neighbors while executing the warrant.
- 50. Second, and more particularly, defendants used excessive force in executing the search warrant by arbitrarily pointing their guns at the faces of Mr. Eteghaei and Mrs. Zade when they peacefully exited their home in compliance with the officers' commands. (See, e.g., Thompson v. Rahr, 885 F.3d 582, 587 (9th Cir. 2018) ("pointing guns at persons who are compliant and present no danger is a constitutional violation") (quoting Baird v. Renbarger, 576 F.3d 340, 346 (7th Cir. 2009)); Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 845 (9th Cir. 2007) ("We have held that the pointing of a gun at someone may constitute excessive force, even if it does not cause physical injury"); Baldwin v. Placer County, 418 F.3d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting qualified immunity claim of officers for excessive force claim in execution of warrant; defendants "violated the civil right of the plaintiffs to be free from battery by gun-wielding officers, a right established in this circuit since 1984") (citing McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985) (Kennedy, J.).)

51	l. Thi	rd, the defendant of	fficers used exc	cessive force	ce in execu	ting the sea	arch warrant
by handcı	uffing M	r. Eteghaei and Mrs	. Zade when th	ey peacefu	lly exited	the home.	(See, e.g.,
Meredith	v. Erath,	342 F.3d 1057, 10d	63 (9th Cir. 200	03) ("Our c	lecision to	day makes	it clear that
[handcuff	ing a per	rson and detaining h	er in handcuffs	s during a s	earch for e	evidence],	absent
justifiable	e circums	stances, will result in	n a Fourth Ame	endment vi	olation.").)	

- 52. *Fourth*, the defendant officers used excessive force against Mrs. Zade by placing handcuffs on her so tightly as to cause noticeable physical injuries to her wrists.
- 53. *Fifth*, the defendant officers unreasonably detained plaintiffs in their execution of the search warrant by pointing guns at them, handcuffing them, and forcing Mrs. Zade into a law enforcement vehicle reasonable suspicion or probable cause. (*See, e.g., Franklin v. Foxwith*, 31 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1994) (a detention may be unlawful under the Fourth Amendment "either because the detention itself is [unreasonable] or because it is carried out in an unreasonable manner").)
- 54. Defendants did the aforesaid acts under color of law, purportedly in performing their official duties.
- 55. As a direct and proximate result of defendants' illegal conduct, plaintiffs suffered actual injuries and damages.
- 56. The acts and omissions alleged in this Complaint are indicative and representative of a repeated course of conduct by defendant County of Alameda tantamount to a custom, policy or practice of condoning and tacitly encouraging the disregard for the constitutional rights of Alameda County citizens, as described herein. The County is, therefore, liable under *Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of the City of New York*, 429 U.S. 1071 (1977).

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

Conspiracy to Violate Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment Rights (42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985)

(Against All Defendants)

- 57. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 56 of this Complaint as though fully alleged herein.
- 58. Defendants conspired with each other to violate the civil rights of plaintiffs, in particular, the Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force and unreasonable searches and seizures.
- 59. Defendants did the aforesaid acts under color of law, purportedly in performing their official duties.
- 60. By conspiring to execute the search warrant at plaintiffs' residence in an excessive and unreasonable manner, defendants violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is a violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986

- 61. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 60 of this complaint as though fully set forth herein.
- 62. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as the use of excessive force, in executing search warrants
- 63. By planning and failing to prevent their officers from executing the search warrant in an unconstitutional manner, defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1986.

- 64. Defendants did the aforesaid acts under color of law, purportedly in performing their official duties.
- 65. As a direct and proximate result of defendants' illegal conduct, plaintiffs suffered actual injuries and damages.
- 66. The acts and omissions alleged in this Complaint are indicative and representative of a repeated course of conduct by defendants County of Alameda tantamount to a custom, policy or practice of the agencies of condoning and tacitly encouraging the disregard for the constitutional rights of Alameda County citizens, as described herein.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

SUPERVISORY LIABILITY (42 U.S.C. § 1983)

(Against Defendants Lt. Farruggia, Sgt. Levette, and UCSB Det. Avila)

- 67. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 66 of this Complaint as though fully alleged herein.
- 68. Defendants Lt. Farruggia, Sgt. Levette, and UCSB Det. Avila supervised the officers who executed the search warrant and were present at, or knew about, its execution.
- 69. Defendants did the aforesaid acts under color of law, purportedly in performing their official duties.
- 70. The supervisors acquiesced in and ratified the illegal conduct described in this complaint.
- 71. As a direct and proximate result of the said wrongful conduct and/or omissions of defendants Lt. Farruggia, Sgt. Levette, and UCSB Det. Avila, plaintiffs suffered actual injuries and damages.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Violation of California Constitution, article 1, § 7, subdivision (a)

(Against All Defendants)

- 72. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 71 of this complaint as though fully set forth herein.
- 73. Article 1, section 7, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as the use of excessive force, in executing search warrants.
- 74. By seizing plaintiffs without reasonable suspicion or probable cause and executing the search in the excessive and unlawful manner, defendants violated article 1, section 7 of the California Constitution.
- 75. As a direct and proximate result of defendants' illegal conduct, plaintiffs suffered actual injuries and damages.
- 76. The acts and omissions alleged in this Complaint are indicative and representative of a repeated course of conduct by defendant County of Alameda tantamount to a custom, policy or practice of condoning and tacitly encouraging the disregard for the constitutional rights of Alameda County citizens, as described herein. The County is, therefore, liable under *Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of the City of New York*, 429 U.S. 1071 (1977).

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Violation of California Civil Code § 52.1

(Against All Defendants)

77. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 76 of this complaint as though fully set forth herein.

- 78. Article 1, section 7, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as the use of excessive force, in executing search warrants. So, too, do the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
- 79. By executing the search in the excessive and unlawful manner described above, preceded by threats, intimidation, coercion, and an illegal detention/arrest, defendants interfered with, and attempted to interfere by threats, intimidation and coercion with plaintiffs' peaceable enjoyment of the rights secured to them by the federal and state constitutions, in violation of the Bane Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civil Code section 52.1.
- 80. As a direct and proximate result of defendants' illegal conduct, plaintiffs suffered actual injuries and damages.
- 81. The acts and omissions alleged in this Complaint are indicative and representative of a repeated course of conduct by defendant County of Alameda tantamount to a custom, policy or practice of condoning and tacitly encouraging the disregard for the constitutional rights of Alameda County citizens, as described herein.
- 82. Under California Government Code section 820(a), the individual officer defendants are liable for damages for their own misconduct.
- 83. Under California Government Code section 815.2(a), the public entity employers are vicariously liable for conduct performed within the scope and course of defendants' employment.

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EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Conspiracy to Violate California Civil Code § 52.1

- 84. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 83 of this complaint as though fully set forth herein.
- 85. Article 1, section 7, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as the use of excessive force, in executing search warrants. So, too, does the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
- 86. By conspiring to execute the search in the excessive and unlawful manner described above, preceded by threats intimidation and coercion, defendants interfered with, and attempted to interfere by threats, intimidation and coercion with plaintiffs' peaceable enjoyment of the rights secured to them by the federal and state constitutions, in violation of the Bane Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civil Code section 52.1.
- 87. As a direct and proximate result of defendants' illegal conduct, plaintiffs suffered actual injuries and damages.
- 88. The acts and omissions alleged in this Complaint are indicative and representative of a repeated course of conduct by defendant County of Alameda tantamount to a custom, policy or practice of condoning and tacitly encouraging the disregard for the constitutional rights of Alameda County citizens, as described herein.
- 89. Under California Government Code section 820(a), the individual officer defendants are liable for damages for their own misconduct.

90. Under California Government Code section 815.2(a), the public entity employers are vicariously liable for conduct performed within the scope and course of defendants' employment.

NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION

NEGLIGENT HIRING, TRAINING, AND SUPERVISION

(Against Defendants County of Alameda, Alameda County Sheriff's Office, Sheriff
Gregory H. Ahern, Lt. Farruggia, and Does 1-50)

- 91. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 90 of this Complaint as though fully alleged herein.
- 92. Upon information and belief, Defendants County of Alameda, the Alameda County Sheriff's Office, Sheriff Gregory H. Ahern, Lt. Farruggia, and DOES 1-50 hire, train, and supervise the Deputy Sheriffs of Alameda County, including the individually named police officers in this action.
- 93. Defendants County of Alameda, the Alameda County Sheriff's Office, Sheriff Gregory H. Ahern, Lt. Farruggia, and DOES 1-50were unfit and/or incompetent to perform the work for which they were hired, trained and/or supervised, and Defendants County of El Dorado, Sheriff John D'Agostini, and DOES 21-40 knew and/or should have known that they were unfit and/or incompetent and that this unfitness and/or incompetence created a risk of harm to the legal rights of individuals like plaintiffs.
- 94. As a direct and proximate result of the said wrongful conduct and/or omissions of defendants County of Alameda, the Alameda County Sheriff's Office, Sheriff Gregory H. Ahern, Lt. Farruggia, and DOES 1-50, plaintiffs suffered actual injuries and damages..

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TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

ASSAULT

(Against All Defendants)

- 95. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 94 of this Complaint as though fully alleged herein.
- 96. The defendants acted with the intent to cause harmful or offensive conduct by pointing their excessive display of force in executing the plaintiffs, pointing guns at them and handcuffing them.
- 97. The plaintiffs reasonably believed that they were about to be touched, or worse, in a harmful or offensive manner.
- 98. As a direct and proximate result of the said wrongful conduct and/or omissions of defendants, plaintiffs suffered actual injuries and damages.
- 99. Under Government Code § 820(a), the individual officer defendants are liable for their own misconduct.
- 100. Under Government Code § 815.2(a), the public entity are vicariously liable for conduct performed by the individual officers within the scope and course of their employment.

ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

BATTERY

- 101. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 100 of this Complaint as though fully alleged herein.
- 102. The defendants touched, caused to be touched, or threatened to touch plaintiffs with the intent to harm or offend them.

- 103. The plaintiffs did not consent to the touching.
- 104. As a direct and proximate result of the said wrongful conduct and/or omissions of defendants, plaintiffs suffered actual injuries and damages.
- 105. Under Government Code § 820(a), the individual officer defendants are liable for their own misconduct.
- 106. Under Government Code § 815.2(a), the public entity are vicariously liable for conduct performed by the individual officers within the scope and course of their employment.

TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

- 107. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 106 of this Complaint as though fully alleged herein.
- 108. Defendants conduct, as described above, was extreme and outrageous with the intention of causing, or recklessly disregarding, the probability of causing plaintiffs emotional distress.
 - 109. Plaintiffs suffered severe or extreme emotional distress.
- 110. As a direct and proximate result of the said wrongful conduct and/or omissions of defendants, plaintiffs suffered actual injuries and damages.
- 111. Under Government Code § 820(a), the individual officer defendants are liable for their own misconduct.
- 112. Under Government Code § 815.2(a), the public entity are vicariously liable for conduct performed by the individual officers within the scope and course of their employment.

THIRTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

NEGLIGENCE -- INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

(Against All Defendants)

- 113. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 112 of this Complaint as though fully alleged herein.
- 114. Plaintiffs suffered severe emotional distress as a result of perceiving injuries to each other.
 - 115. Defendants conduct, as described above, negligently caused injury to plaintiffs.
- 116. Plaintiffs were present at the scene when each of them suffered injury as a result of defendants' conduct.
 - 117. Defendants were aware they were causing injury to plaintiffs.
 - 118. Plaintiffs suffered serious emotional distress.
- 119. Defendants' conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs' serious emotional distress.
- 120. Under Government Code § 820(a), the individual officer defendants are liable for their own misconduct.
- 121. Under Government Code § 815.2(a), the public entity are vicariously liable for conduct performed by the individual officers within the scope and course of their employment.

FOURTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

NEGLIGENCE

(Against All Defendants)

122. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 122 of this Complaint as though fully alleged herein.

123.	Defendants	owed a	duty	of care	to	plaintiffs.
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- 124. Defendants breached this duty of care to plaintiffs by the conduct described above.
- 125. As a direct and proximate result of defendants' conduct and failure to act, plaintiffs suffered actual injuries and damages.
- 126. Under Government Code § 820(a), the individual officer defendants are liable for their own misconduct.
- 127. Under Government Code § 815.2(a), the public entity are vicariously liable for conduct performed by the individual officers within the scope and course of their employment.

FIFTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

FALSE IMPRISONMENT

- 128. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 127 of this Complaint as though fully alleged herein.
- 129. The defendants intentionally deprived plaintiffs by the use or threatened use of force.
- 130. The detention of plaintiffs compelled plaintiffs to stay or go somewhere for some appreciable time.
 - 131. Plaintiffs did not voluntarily consent to the detention.
 - 132. Plaintiffs were actually harmed by the false imprisonment.
 - 133. Defendants' conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs' harm.
- 134. Under Government Code § 820(a), the individual officer defendants are liable for their own misconduct.

135. Under Government Code § 815.2(a), the public entity are vicariously liable for conduct performed by the individual officers within the scope and course of their employment.

SIXTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

FALSE ARREST

(Against All Defendants)

- 136. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 135 of this Complaint as though fully alleged herein.
 - 137. The defendants arrested plaintiffs without a warrant.
 - 138. Plaintiffs were actually harmed by the false arrest.
 - 139. Defendants' conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs' harm.
- 140. Under Government Code § 820(a), the individual officer defendants are liable for their own misconduct.
- 141. Under Government Code § 815.2(a), the public entity are vicariously liable for conduct performed by the individual officers within the scope and course of their employment.

V. RELIEF SOUGHT

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, seek the following relief:

- 1. A declaration that the defendants' actions are unlawful and unconstitutional;
- 2. A preliminary and permanent injunction, enjoining the defendants and their agents and employees from entering the private property of anyone without securing a warrant, by foot, motor vehicle, or helicopter, unless that property is in an open field;
- 3. A preliminary and permanent injunction, enjoining the defendants and their agents and employees from entering the private property by foot, motor vehicle or helicopter of

anyone and seizing their property without advance notice of at least three (3) days and the opportunity for a meaningful hearing;

- 4. A preliminary and permanent injunction, enjoining the defendants and their agents and employees from taking continued action against anyone under the Cultivation Ordinance where defendants failed to secure a warrant and/or failed to provide advance notice;
- 5. Compensatory damages in an amount no less than \$50,000 and punitive damages, according to proof;
 - 6. Costs and attorneys fees incurred in this action; and
 - 7. Such other and further relief as this Court may be just and proper.

DATED: June 17, 2022

JOSEPH D. ELFORD Counsel for Plaintiffs

VERIFICATION

I declare that my offices are located in the County of San Francisco, which is not the same county as the named plaintiffs, so I verify this Complaint on their behalf. My investigation, combined with the individual declarations, support my verification of the facts alleged in the instant complaint.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 17th day of June, in San Francisco, California.

JOSEPH D. ELFORD Counsel for Plaintiffs

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Verified Complaint

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

JOSEPH D. ELFORD Counsel for Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs hereby demand a jury trial of this action.

 4 \parallel_{DATED} :

June 17, 2022

Eteghaei v. County of Alameda Verified Complaint